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Political Economy of Labor Retrenchment:
Evidence Based on China’s State-Owned Enterprises
Abstract
This study examines the determinants of the restructuring of China’s
SOEs in the late 1990s. Our study yields four major findings. First, we find
that  the  degree  of  labor  retrenchment  is  negatively related  to  enterprise
performance,  suggesting  that  poor  performance  is  a  major  force  driving
labor restructuring. Second, we find that market competition is related to
both traditional and corporatized SOEs, suggesting that market competition
gradually becomes an effective disciplinary force for managers of China’s
SOEs.  Furthermore,  we  offer  evidence  that  decisions  about  labor
retrenchment in traditional SOEs are related to the local government’s fiscal
position  and  to  local  reemployment  conditions  for  laid-off  workers.  In
contrast, labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are not related to these two
variables.  This  suggests  that  corporatized  SOEs  with  partial  private
ownership seem to enjoy higher autonomy in labor decisions. 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P26, P31, G38. 
Key Words: Political Control, State Owned Enterprises, Labor Restructuring
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1. INTRODUCTION
In  the  transformation  economies  of  the  post-Soviet  era,  enterprises  often  found
themselves with a significant stock of surplus labor created by central labor allocation and
full  employment  guarantees  under  the  socialist  system.  Employment  restructuring thus
became  one  of  the  major  objectives  of  enterprise  reform  in  all  these  economies.  To
improve their performance, enterprises not only had to adjust their product assortment in
response to consumer preferences and rapidly changing market conditions but also had to
optimize factor inputs.  Labor reforms usually started with the promulgation  of flexible
labor  regulations  and  laws.  Highly  variable  progress  within  employment  restructuring
suggests that the formal provision of market-oriented labor laws and regulations serves as a
necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  condition  for  successful  labor  restructuring.  Labor
retrenchment commonly encounters complex and multifaceted constraints, with political-
economic constraints among the crucial determinants of their success (Fleisher and Yang,
2003). 
Among China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), inertia in the labor retrenchment effort
has been pronounced.  There are two types of SOEs in China: those that maintain 100%
state  ownership  (traditional  SOEs),  and  those  that  have  undergone  ownership
diversification  but  still  have  dominant  state  shares  (corporatized  SOEs).  SOEs  were
granted some formal autonomy in labor decisions in the mid-1980s but did not undertake
any significant labor restructuring until the mid-1990s. Although SOE profits fell by 50%
between 1994 and 1996, they failed to restructure in any significant sense. In fact, the size
of the total SOE work force increased slightly (see Table 1).
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Insert Table 1 about here 
Many observers have identified continuing government interference in labor decisions
as a major cause of  China’s slow SOE labor restructuring. Bai et  al.  (2002) argue that
SOEs  in China were used  as policy tools to provide exaggerated levels of employment
because alternative institutions for social welfare provision (unemployment benefits) are
still  underdeveloped  or  even  nonexistent.  Groves  et  al.  (1995)  offer  evidence  that
increasing de facto managerial independence from political control in labor decisions was
positively related to labor productivity and enterprise performance in China’s SOEs from
1980  to  1989.  This  result  confirms  the  existence  of  political  control  in  SOEs’  labor
decisions. Dong and Putterman (2002) further establish that hardening budget constraints,
without  relieving SOEs of  their  social  burden,  was  a  major  proximate  cause of  rising
redundant labor in the early 1990s. 
Because  of  low productivity  levels  and  growing enterprise  debts,  in  1997  China’s
central  government  pledged to  reverse  SOEs’  money-losing  trends  within  a  three-year
period, with labor retrenchment as one of the major reform measures. The government’s
commitment  to  improving  SOE performance  through  large-scale  labor  restructuring  is
illustrated  by  its  increasing  provision  of  financial  assistance  and  labor  reemployment
services  for  displaced  workers  (Dong 2003).  Within  four  years (1997–2000), the  state
sector’s work force decreased by more than 30 million workers (about 27%), and labor
productivity increased by 100% (see Table 1).  In spite  of significant  progress  in  labor
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retrenchment  as signaled by aggregate data, however,  little systematic research has been
conducted  to  examine  the  underlying  causal  patterns  and  determinants of  the  recent
restructuring wave. Which enterprises successfully took on the challenge of restructuring?
Can we still observe evidence of government control in SOEs’ labor decisions? Is there any
difference  between  traditional  and  corporatized  SOEs  in  terms  of  labor  retrenchment?
These are all questions that need to be answered.
Based on data obtained from a World Bank survey, this paper investigates the major
driving forces of labor restructuring among China’s SOEs from 1998 to 2000. Specifically,
we examine how the degree of labor retrenchment is related to a set of business-related and
political-economic determinants. To the best of our knowledge, our study is among the first
to investigate the causal pattern of labor restructuring during the most recent SOE reforms.
Empirical evidence on this issue will shed some light on the nature of labor policies in
SOEs and on the nexus between government and SOEs in China’s increasingly market-
oriented economy. An understanding of the government-SOE nexus in China is particularly
critical, as the government is determined to maintain large and medium-sized SOEs as an
important part of the economic system. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief account of China’s
labor  market  reforms  since  1978  and  the  specific  institutional  background  of  SOEs’
employment restructuring in the late 1990s. Section 3 discusses the potential determinants
of an SOE’s labor policies and sets out our hypotheses. Section 4 presents our estimation
model and results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. LABOR MARKET REFORMS: THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND STATUS QUO
Before reform, labor in China was directly allocated to SOEs. In return, SOEs had to
fulfill production quotas specified by production plans and had to provide workers with
comprehensive benefits packages including subsidized housing, education, health care, and
retirement pensions. Following the introduction of industrial reforms in the early 1980s, a
“dual-track  transition”  of  the  labor  market  was  instituted.  Free  labor  markets  were
developed in the newly emerging non-state sector, while SOEs continued to perform the
dual tasks of producing goods and providing social welfare and only gradually acquired the
formal  right  to  make  independent  employment  decisions  according to  their  production
needs (Bai et al. 2002). 
A first important breakthrough in the liberalization of the labor system was achieved in
1986, when the labor contract system (laodong hetongzhi) was introduced on a pilot basis
to  replace  socialist-style  lifelong  employment  in  SOEs.  In  addition,  SOEs’
directors/managers acquired the right to conduct entrance exams to screen promising job
applicants, to refuse ill-qualified applicants, and to institute a probation period for new
hires. To stave off opposition of the new system, it was first applied only to new hires; it
became universal only in 1996. As a consequence, the move toward contract-based labor
proceeded slowly. By the end of 1995 only 40% of SOE employees were working under
the new system, while complete implementation of the system was not realized until 2000
(China’s Labor Statistics Yearbook, various years). 
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In 1992 the  “regulations  for  the  transformation  of  enterprise  mechanisms of  state-
owned enterprises” were promulgated. Art.  17 gave management, for the first  time, the
formal right to autonomously make decisions about “conditions and type of employment as
well as the number of employees.” Central plans for labor allocation were abolished in
1993. 
The implementation of China’s Labor Law in 1995 was probably the most important
legal reform, as this law formally grants all enterprises, including SOEs, legal rights to
restructure and to eliminate excessive labor. The liberalization effect of the law rests on
three crucial  provisions,  which facilitate  adjustment and restructuring decisions:  (1) the
general  application  of  labor  contracts  with  time  limits  (Art.  19);  (2)  agreements  on
probation periods (Art. 21); and, most important, (3) the right to cut down on manpower
when  an  enterprise  runs  into  economic  difficulties  (Art.  27).  In  particular,  the  latter
provision  introduces  new  flexibility  for  timely  labor  adjustments  in  response  to  an
enterprise’s order situation and profitability.  As labor  relations between employers and
employees are legally specified, and labor contracts can be terminated by both sides,  the
law  formally  finalized  the  break  with  China’s  “iron  rice  bowl.”  Authority  over  labor
decisions was formally transferred from the state to enterprise managers in all enterprises,
including SOEs. 
Despite a wide range of policy measures introduced to reform SOEs, up to the mid-
1990s the dismissal of state employees remained a rarity, and most SOEs still  provided
non-wage welfare benefits (Dong 2003). Zhang (1994) reports that only 2% of SOEs made
use of their formal rights to terminate labor contracts. Based on a panel data set of 681
7
SOEs in four provinces (Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Jilin), Dong and Putterman (2002)
confirm that SOE managers’ ability to perform downward adjustment of the labor force
remained seriously limited until 1994. Bodmer (2002) documents the degree and the effects
of  labor  reforms in  Chinese  SOEs  up  to  1994 and  concludes  that  reforms relevant  to
employment  decisions  in  SOEs  remained  very  limited  in  scope.  In  addition,  ample
evidence  shows that  a  large proportion of  SOEs have failed to  restructure and remain
burdened by excess manpower and low productivity. 
The lack of effective labor restructuring up to the mid-1990s has been largely attributed
to the use of SOEs for employment and social security provision (Meng and Kid 1997, Bai
et  al.  2002).  In the  late  1990s  the  heavily indebted  and ailing state  sector  forced  the
government to address the labor redundancy problem. Since then, millions of workers have
been  let  go.  Nevertheless,  labor  restructuring  in  China’s  SOEs  is  still  an  unfinished
endeavor.  Brooks and Tao (2003) estimate that about 10 to 18 million workers were still
redundant in 2001. 
3.  WHEN DO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES RESTRUCTURE?  SOME POLITICAL ECONOMY
CONSIDERATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In a neo-classical world, an enterprise’s labor input would be calculated  based on a
production function, input prices, and expected sales, while flexible labor markets would
guarantee smooth adjustment processes. SOEs, however,  seldom  operate as independent
business entities responding only to market forces. This is because politicians tend to use
them to  enhance their political support (Buchanan et al. 1980, Shapiro and Willig 1990,
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Shleifer and Vishny 1994).1 This tendency is particularly strong in socialist systems and is
especially pronounced in China because China’s danwei-socialism guaranteed urban SOE
workers  not  only  lifetime  employment  but  also  a  wide  range  of  benefits  such  as
inexpensive  housing,  free  medical  care,  and  diverse  types  of  subsidies  and  in-kind
payments (Naughton 1997). SOE workers were thus naturally reluctant to accept market-
based labor reforms.  Dong and Ye (2003) offer evidence that employees of loss-making
enterprises  in  China tended to cling to their  jobs,  preferring to take wage cuts  than to
change jobs. Workers frequently expressed their  discontent through protests and strikes
(Lee  1998) as  well  as  through  “collective  inaction”  in  the  form  of  noncompliance,
absenteeism, and evasion (Whyte 1987, Zhou 1993, Lee 1998). Protests and strikes often
compelled the government  to  pressure enterprise  managers to  hire  extra  workers  or  to
refrain  from  imposing  additional  layoffs,  whereas  collective  inaction  generated  direct
pressure  on  managers  because  managers’  performance  is  dependent  on  workers’
cooperation (Whyte 1987, Lee 1998).2 
The Chinese Communist government, on the other hand, is eager to continue danwei-
socialism to secure social support (Opper, Wong, and Hu 2002). Although the theory of
political business cycles has been developed largely with reference to democratic political
systems, the general idea that politicians’ survival rests on public support also holds for
autocratic regimes. Even China’s one-party regime needs to respond to major interest 
1Politicians are particularly apt to intervene in labor decisions, since employment  opportunities  and wage
levels provide convenient tools by which to redistribute wealth from the common pool to the favored parties
(Nordhaus 1975, Frey and Schneider 1978). 
2 Bai et al. (2000) provide a formal model establishing the superiority of delayed privatization and continuing
provision of social security by SOEs if social stability is weak. 
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groups, such as the urban working class, if political stability and the immediate survival
of the political leadership are to be secured. Using SOEs to keep redundant labor seemed
particularly important during the early transition period when a sustainable social security
system was not yet in place and the newly emerging private sector lacked the capacity to
absorb excessive labor. 
Bai et al. (2002) argue that managers in China’s SOEs were in fact charged with the
dual role of maintaining production and providing social security. To induce them to shift
efforts from production to social security provision, the government provided them with
smaller  profit  incentives, which led to SOEs’ continuous poor performance. In spite of
significant progress in reducing the number of redundant workers, in our view, the recent
wave  of  labor  retrenchment  is  unlikely to  signal  a  complete  depoliticization  of  labor
policies. Rather, managers will continue to perform the dual role of maintaining production
and  providing  social  security.  Thus,  we  assume that  labor  retrenchment  in  SOEs  is  a
function of both business-related and political-economic factors. To test our assumption,
we  develop  four  hypotheses  on  these  two  types  of  determinants  and  then  empirically
examine whether labor retrenchment in SOEs is actually related to these factors. 
Business-related factors
Enterprise  performance.  Studies  on  adjustment  strategies  following  an  enterprise’s
performance  decline  indicate  that  downsizing  of  the  work  force  is  one  of  the  most
commonly adopted  short-term strategies  to  improve  enterprise performance (Denis  and
Kruse 2000, Kang and Shivdasani 1997). Enterprises burdened with excessive employment
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are particularly likely to benefit  from labor adjustments,  as cutting redundant labor can
reduce labor costs without affecting production capacity and sales. We expect that
H1: The degree of labor retrenchment is negatively related to enterprise performance.
Competition. Studies on SOEs in Eastern European transitional economies support the role
of competition, as they find that many SOEs have undertaken restructuring activities “that
are broadly consistent with what would be expected of profit-maximizing firms” (Pinto et
al. 1994, Aghion et al.  1994, Brada et al.  1994, Estrin et al. 1995, Brada 1996, p. 80).
Overall, we expect that
H2: The degree of labor retrenchment is positively related to the degree of
competition.
Political-economic factors
Government’s  fiscal  position.  The fact  that  government  interference  in  labor  decisions
affects government budget position by increasing expenditures (e.g., subsidies to SOEs)
and decreasing revenues (e.g., tax income) suggests that a government’s fiscal capacity will
limit its ability to fund excessive employment (Sheifer and Vishny 1994).3 A tight  fiscal
position (i.e., a high budget deficit) might increase the government’s willingness to accept
politically  unpopular  labor  retrenchment,  since  labor  shedding  and  the  concomitant
improvement  in  financial  performance  brings  financial  release  via  tax  increases  and
3 Empirical  studies  on privatization suggest that  a  government’s policymaking decisions depend to some
extent on the tightness of fiscal budget constraints. State withdrawal, in general, is more likely to occur during
an economic crisis when financial conditions are dire and public debt is regarded as excessive (World Bank
1995).
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subsidy reduction  (Li  1998). At  the  same time,  managers’  willingness  to  comply with
requests articulated by the government and workers depends on their budget constraints
and on the likelihood that they will be compensated for retaining excessive labor (Shleifer
and Vishny 1994). A tight fiscal position signals relatively harder budget constraints for
SOEs  as  well  as  a  decreased  likelihood  of  being  adequately  compensated  by  the
government for retaining excessive employment. We hypothesize that 
H3: The degree of labor entrenchment is negatively related to the government’s 
budget.
Absorption capacity of laid-off workers. While early models of political business cycles
assume that a government’s incentives and expected benefits from inducing political cycles
do not vary over time, more recent research has revealed that the expected benefits for
manipulating  the  economy  should  be  negatively  correlated  with  the  level  of  the
government’s political security and the size of the support base  (Schultz 1995). As low
reemployment  possibilities  for  surplus  workers  increase  workers’  resistance  to  labor
retrenchment and weaken a government’s political security and support base, a government
will benefit more (politically) by funding a certain level of excess labor if reemployment
possibilities  for  surplus  worker  are  low.  In  contrast,  a  government  will  benefit  less
(politically) by funding a certain level of excess labor if reemployment possibilities are
high.  Therefore, the local absorption capacity for surplus labor could be a government’s
major political concern. Overall, we expect that
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H4: The  degree  of  labor  retrenchment  is  positively  related  to  the  local  absorption
capacity for surplus labor. 
We do not expect the determinants of labor retrenchment to possess the same degree of
explanatory power  irrespective of an enterprise’s ownership structure.  Equal  impact  on
labor retrenchment for traditional and corporatized SOEs would presuppose an identical
cost-benefit  calculus  for  politicians  irrespective  of  an  enterprise’s  ownership  structure.
Following Shleifer’s and Vishny’s (1994) model on political interventions into enterprise
decisions, even partial privatization may increase the costs of political intervention at the
enterprise  level,  since  non-state  owners  will  ask  for  compensation  for  negative
performance  effects.  Partial  privatization  may  therefore  trigger  a  depoliticization  of
decision-making at the enterprise level. Wong et al. (2004) have shown that different types
of shareholders are associated with varying degrees of political control in China’s listed
enterprises. We therefore investigate the determinants of labor restructuring for these two
types  of  SOEs  separately.  We  expect  that  political-economic  determinants  of  labor
retrenchment will be more evident for traditional SOEs than for corporatized SOEs, while
business-related determinants will be more evident for corporatized SOEs. 
4. DATA AND METHODS
4.1 Data and Variables
Data Sources and Sample Enterprises
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The empirical  data  for  our  research  comes  from a World  Bank  survey of  China’s
enterprises. The survey was conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics in 2001. It
covers  323 SOEs,  of  which 197  are  traditional  and 126  are  corporatized.  The  sample
enterprises are randomly drawn from ten sectors in five cities.  A summary of enterprise
distributions across sectors and cities is shown in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
As shown in Table 2, the five cities are Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and
Tianjin, covering municipalities in China’s highly developed eastern coastal belt (Beijing,
Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Tianjin) as well as the central region (Chengdu). The chosen
locations also represent different levels of market reforms, with Guangzhou representing
the most liberal province in terms of private sector development and Shanghai representing
a national base of SOEs concentrating in heavy industry. 
The ten sectors include  five service sectors—accounting, advertising and marketing,
business logistics, communication,  and information technology—and five manufacturing
sectors—apparel  and  leather  goods,  consumer  goods,  electronic  equipment,  electronic
components, and  vehicles  and vehicle  parts. The  five  chosen  manufacturing industries
reflect  China’s  current  or  potential  competitive  sectors,4 while  the  five  service  sectors
represent fast-growing and relatively technologically advanced portions of China’s 
4 For example, apparel and leather products, electronic equipment, respectively, accounted for 11.5% and
16.8% of China’s total exports in 1999.
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 industry. 
The data set provides us with a broad variety of enterprise-level data, which allows for
the  measurement  of  the  most  important  business-related determinants  of  labor  policy
choices. We complement the data set with socioeconomic regional data to cover potential
political-economic determinants of employment restructuring. The socioeconomic data are
derived from China’s Labor Statistics Yearbook and the China Statistical Yearbook.
Dependent Variables
We construct the labor-retrenchment-rate variable as a direct measurement with which
to investigate how SOEs are tackling the surplus labor issue. The variable is defined as the
ratio of a labor reduction in the current period to the total work force of the preceding
period. Accordingly, the labor retrenchment rate is positive if  an enterprise reduces the
number of workers it employs in the current period and negative if it increases the number.
 
Independent Variables
The determinants—business-related and political-economic factors—mentioned in the
previous theoretical discussion serve as explanatory variables. 
Enterprise  Performance.  We  employ  two  alternative  variables—sales  revenue  and
profit—to measure enterprise performance. These variables are deflated by industrial price
indices created by the China Statistical Yearbook and are transformed into logistic form. 
We first  estimate a baseline model using the current  value of the two performance
variables  alternately as  the  determinant.  We  use  current  performance  because  labor
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adjustments, in comparison with capital adjustments, are usually short-run responses that
can react more quickly and directly to current performance. We do not expect a serious
problem of endogeneity when current value of performance is used. Specifically, for the
first variable of sales revenue, a reduction in an enterprise’s excessive labor is unlikely to
affect  its  production  capacity  and  sales  volume.  For  the  second  variable  of  profit,  a
reduction in labor redundancy is likely to improve the enterprise’s profit, so the effect of
labor reduction on profit is positive, which is the opposite of our hypothesized negative
effect of profit on labor reduction in the model. In sum, the endogeneity problem, if any,
will not cause an identification problem for our estimation. We take yet another step to use
lagged enterprise performance as an instrument for current performance, and we reestimate
the model as a robustness check.
Competition.  We  use  two  proxies  for  competition.  The  first  is  the  number  of
competitors for an enterprise’s major business line as estimated by enterprise managers.
The  second  is  an  enterprise’s  ratio  of  exports  to  sales,  which  implies  its  exposure  to
competition on the international market. The more an enterprise integrates into the world
market,  the more severe the competition it  faces,  and the stronger incentives  it  has  to
improve labor efficiency. 
Government’s fiscal position. To approximate the government’s financial leverage, we
focus on the ratio of the balance of the government’s budget to gross domestic product
(GDP). It is assumed that governments under a budget deficit are more likely to refrain
from providing employment directly through SOEs than are governments with a balanced
budget or a surplus.
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Absorption  capacity for  laid-off  workers.  We use  two proxies  to  capture  the  local
absorption capacity for surplus labor. First, we calculate the ratio of reemployed laid-off
workers to laid-off workers who have not been reemployed. Second, we use employment
growth rates in the private sector, including foreign-involved enterprises. The private sector
was  formally promoted  as  a  convenient  channel  for  absorbing  redundant  workers  and
farmers in 1997 and is closely correlated with local growth and development.  The two
proxies for reemployment chance are constructed at the city level.
Control Variables
Some factors can jointly affect labor retrenchment and our explanatory variables. We
introduce five control variables  to capture possible confounding effects. The first control
variable is SOE age. Older SOEs with a long tradition in the planning apparatus are subject
to stronger political control and interference owing to their established and stable network
relationships with the government administration. At the same time, age is likely to be
negatively related  to the extent of an SOE’s  work force adjustment, because older SOEs
tend to have a higher level of organizational inertia. We therefore introduce the variable of
SOE age to eliminate the possible confounding age effect. 
We also use an SOE’s total work force in the previous year to control for SOE size. A
large work force may be connected with a higher degree of underemployment and therefore
with higher potential for labor retrenchment than a smaller work force. On the other hand,
SOE size may be negatively related to the degree of labor retrenchment because there is a
cost advantage for the government in using larger SOEs to provide employment. Assume
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that a local government decides that 5,000 positions for underemployed workers need to be
secured. Option 1 would be to bargain with 10 enterprises, each with 5,000 employees, to
convince each to keep 10% of its redundant workers. Option 2 would be to bargain with
100 enterprises, each with 500 employees, to convince each to keep 10% of its redundant
workers. Clearly, transactions costs would be much higher for option 2. This assumption is
consistent  with  the  finding  that  privatization  of  large  enterprises  in  Central  Eastern
European countries is  shaped  by political-economic determinants,  while progress in the
privatization  of small  enterprises  is  unaffected by such determinants (Opper 2004). We
therefore introduce the size of an SOE’s work force in the previous period to capture the
conflicting effects associated with SOE size. 
The third  control variable is unionization rates, defined as the proportion of workers
joining unions in different regions, to capture the bargaining position of workers vis à vis
the  government and  managers.  According  to  Olson  (1968)  we  may  expect  that
underemployed workers could articulate their interests more effectively and could threaten
to weaken a government’s public support  base if  they were better organized.  Although
China’s labor unions have historically been subordinated to the interests of the Chinese
Communist Party and therefore lack an independent voice comparable to that of unions in
capitalist economies, unions are nevertheless the only bureaucracies in China that hold a
pro-worker stance.  We therefore control for the unionization rate to remove the possible
confounding effect. 
We also introduce a set of industrial dummies as control variables in our specification.
On the one hand, industrial sectors may be burdened with underemployment to varying
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degrees because the government has fostered various national and local industrial policies
since 1989. On the other hand, industrial sectors may be correlated with our hypothesized
political-economic  determinants.  For  example,  different  industries  are  likely  to  be
associated  with  different  market  competition  conditions  and  varying  enterprise
performance.  Finally,  year  dummies are  introduced  to  capture  potential  year-specific
business cycle effects.
4.2 Regression Models
We use the following model to  estimate the determinants of labor retrenchment  (see
Djankov and Murrell 2002). 
 Yit = α + β Xit + γ Pit + + δ CONTROLit + η Sector + θ Year + εit  (1) 
where i and t represent enterprise i and period t respectively; εit is the error term. Y is a
measure of labor retrenchment ratio, X consists of variables representing business-related
factors,  and  P  comprises  political-economic  factors.  Control  is  a  vector  of  control
variables.  And Sector and Year are sector and year dummies to control the variation across
sectors and over years.
Two estimation issues are worth noting. First, we use white-corrected standard errors to
deal with potential heteroskedasticity. Second, we are unable to perform enterprise-specific
effects in our analysis since the socioeconomic environment variables vary across cities but
not across enterprises. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Sample Data
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of variables included in our regression model.
Three facts stand out in comparing statistics from traditional and corporatized SOEs. First,
for corporatized SOEs, the number of workers and amount of capital, on average, are 1,180
workers and 247 million RMB, while traditional SOEs have almost twice as many workers
and twice  as  much capital.  Consistent  with  the  official  policy of  “seizing  the  big and
relieving  the  small”  (zhua  da  fang  xiao),  privatization  in  China  was  first  confined  to
relatively  small  SOEs.  Second,  corporatized  SOEs  are  much  younger  than  traditional
SOEs, with an average age of 20.97 and 28.39 years, respectively. Finally, it is shown that
the  return on asset (ROA)  of corporatized SOEs is three times that of traditional SOEs,
although the value of sales and profits in corporitized SOEs is less than that of traditional
SOEs. 
The sampled SOEs cut around 4.3 percent of their work force on average between 1998
and 2000; the degree of labor reduction in traditional SOEs was slightly higher (4.7%) than
that  of  corporatized  SOEs  (3.8%).  The  difference  in  work  force  reduction  between
traditional  and  corporatized  SOEs  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that  corporatized  SOEs
usually succeed in reducing redundant labor when they undergo corporatization.
We  notice  that,  on  average,  enterprise  managers  expect  to  have  more  than  313
competitors, which reflects the severe competition in the production market in the sample
sectors.  Surprisingly,  managers  of  traditional  SOEs perceive stronger  competition  (381
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competitors,  on  average)  while  corporatized  SOEs  perceive  weaker  competition  (205
competitors, on average). 
As indicated in Table 3, the export-to-sales ratio for SOEs is slightly higher than that
for corporatized SOEs (7.38 vs. 5.43), which is consistent with the long-standing policy of
granting foreign trade rights mainly to wholly state-owned enterprises in foreign trade. In
parallel,  the  larger  size  of  traditional  SOEs  may place  them in  a  stronger  position  to
compete on the global market. 
The fiscal position to GDP ratio on average is negative, although the size of the budget
deficit  is  moderate  (around  1.44%).  The  average  annual  reemployment  rate  and  the
employment growth rate in the private sector are 45.21% and 42.72%, respectively, which
reflects a relatively favorable socioeconomic environment for labor reform over the survey
period. The unionization rate is generally high, with around 60% of the local work force
being organized in trade unions. 
Insert Table 3 about here
We also conduct a Pearson correlation test and find that all correlations are lower than
the threshold value of 0.7, which suggests that our model is unlikely to suffer problems due
to multicollinearity.
Insert Table 4 about here
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5.2 Regression Results
Table 4 presents the results  of our regression analyses of the determinants  of labor
retrenchment  among  China’s  SOEs.5 First,  we  notice  that  enterprise  performance  is
significantly and negatively correlated with the degree of labor retrenchment.6 This finding
is  consistent  with  H1 and is  consistent  with  two different  interpretations  of  the nexus
between government and enterprises in labor decisions. The first interpretation is that the
government has transferred decision-making autonomy in labor decisions to managers and
has also sufficiently hardened SOEs’ financial constraints so that managers in enterprises
with  declining  performance  are  compelled  to  reduce  their  work  force.  The  second
interpretation is that labor decisions in SOEs are still controlled by the government, but the
government’s  decision  to  use  SOEs  to  provide  excessive  employment  depends  on
enterprise performance. The government tends to use SOEs with improving performance to
keep excessive labor but to allow SOEs with declining performance to reduce labor. From
our  estimates,  we  are  not  able  to  distinguish  between  these  two  interpretations.
Nevertheless,  both explanations independently and jointly suggest that economic forces
meanwhile have had a significant effect on the recent wave of labor restructuring. 
Regarding  the  relationship  between competition  and labor  retrenchment,  we  find  a
significantly positive relationship only between the number of competitors and the degree
of labor retrenchment for corporatized SOEs. For both traditional and corporatized SOEs,
there is no significant relationship between the integration into international markets and
the degree of labor retrenchment. Our study therefore provides only limited support for H2.
5 As we discuss above, we include sector and year dummies in the regressions to control for firm-specific and
year-specific effects. To save space, we do not report the estimated coefficients of these dummies.
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Market competition tends to generate more pressure for managers in corporatized SOEs,
while  labor  decisions  in  traditional  SOEs are  less  significantly affected by competitive
pressure. 
The fiscal position of local  government is negatively related to the degree of labor
retrenchment  in  traditional  SOEs  but  not  in  corporatized  SOEs.  H3  is  therefore  only
supported for traditional SOEs. Our results indicate that labor decisions in traditional SOEs
are  shaped  by budgetary conditions  of  local  government  either  through  direct  transfer
effects  (via  subsidies  to  SOEs  or  expenditure  on  social  welfare  provision)  or  indirect
incentive effects of soft-budget constraints. The labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are
unrelated to government fiscal position, suggesting relatively independent labor decisions. 
The  reemployment  ratio  and  the  growth  of  employment  in  the  private  sector  are
positively related to the degree of labor entrenchment in traditional SOEs; in particular, the
coefficient of the reemployment ratio for laid-off workers is significant. On the other hand,
the  coefficients  for  corporatized  SOEs  are  not  only  statistically  insignificant  but  also
negative.  As  a  result,  our  estimates  support  H4  for  traditional  SOEs  but  not  for
corporatized SOEs. As we assume that local absorption capacity, rather than the objectives
of profit-oriented business entities, is the government’s major political concern, this result
once again suggests that labor decisions  of traditional  SOEs are related to government
objectives,  while  labor  decisions  of  corporatized  SOEs  are  unrelated.  The  relationship
between reemployment chances and labor retrenchment seems fairly robust. Using other
proxies  such as changes in the official  local  unemployment rate and the percentage of
registered laid-off workers from SOEs in the reemployment market, our estimation results
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are confirmed, which underscores the critical  role of the local employment situation in
SOEs’ labor retrenchment.
In addition,  we notice  that  initial  employment  status  is  positively and significantly
associated with the labor retrenchment rate, which might suggest that the labor redundancy
problem is more serious in large enterprises, resulting in their need to cut more labor to
survive during the economic transition. Enterprise age has a positive effect on corporatized
SOEs but little effect  on traditional SOEs. Finally, the labor union variable exhibits no
significant effect on labor entrenchment for either traditional or corporatized SOEs, which
suggests that unionization is not an effective avenue by which workers can resist  labor
reduction.
The  regression  results  of  the  model  using  lagged  performance  as  the  instrument
variable are shown in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 about here
Two items in Table 5 are worth noting. First, we find that not only the reemployment
ratio for laid-off workers but also employment growth in the private sector negatively and
significantly affect a enterprise’s labor retrenchment decisions, reinforcing Hypothesis 4,
which  states  that  absorption  capacity  has  a  significant  impact  on  labor  decisions  in
traditional SOEs. Second, the coefficient of competition for traditional SOEs is marginally
significant,  which  implies  that  competition  pressure  urges  enterprises  to  reduce  more
surplus  labor,  even  in  traditional  SOEs.  Other  regression  results  in  Table  4  remain
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unchanged except that the coefficient for one of the performance variables in corporatized
SOEs becomes statistically insignificant. 
6. CONCLUSION
This study examines the determinants of the restructing of China’s SOEs in the late
1990s, which was eventually implemented to speed up employment restructuring after two
decades of only gradual and often hesitant reforms. Our particular interest was to examine
the business-related and political-economic determinants of labor retrenchment in China’s
traditional and corporatized SOEs, the objective being to shed light on the relationship
between SOEs and government in the increasingly marketized economy.
Our  study  yields  four  major  findings.  First,  we  find  that  the  degree  of  labor
retrenchment  is  negatively  related  to  enterprise  performance,  suggesting  that  poor
performance is  a  major  force  driving labor  restructuring.  Second,  we find  that  market
competition is  related to both traditional  and corporatized SOEs,  but its  effect  is  more
evident  for  corporatized  SOEs  in  our  sample.  This  suggests  that  market  competition
gradually  becomes  an  effective  disciplinary  force  for  managers  of  China’s  SOEs.
Furthermore, we offer evidence that decisions about labor retrenchment in traditional SOEs
are related to the local government’s fiscal position and to local reemployment conditions
for laid-off workers. In contrast, labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are not related to
these two variables. 
In summary, this study suggests that China’s recent adjustment processes have been
driven  at  least  partly  by  economic  forces,  as  evidenced  by  the  negative  relationship
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between  labor  retrenchment  and  enterprise  performance  in  both  traditional  and
corporatized SOEs. In this sense our study suggests that to some extent restructuring is
possible  without  ownership  reforms.  Nonetheless,  the  significant  relationship  between
political-economic determinants (as measured by local reemployment chances and fiscal
constraints) and labor retrenchment suggests that local governments still employ traditional
SOEs if this is deemed necessary to support social stability. Corporatized SOEs with non-
state shareholders, on the other hand, seem to enjoy greater autonomy in labor decisions, as
a  direct  relationship between  the  enterprise’s  labor  policies  and  the  political-economic
conditions could not be substantiated. Our results on corporatized SOEs support the idea
that  depoliticization of enterprise  decision-making—one of the major  enterprise  reform
objectives  in  formerly centrally planned socialist  economies—can actually be achieved
without full-scale privatization. This finding is consistent with Wong et al (2004), who
found significant depoliticization effects for China’s partially privatized listed enterprises.
This  study supports  the  possibility  of  de-politicization  for  labor  decisions  in  China’s
corporatized SOEs not undergoing stock listings. 
The differences between pure and corporatized SOEs in terms of labor retrenchment,
however, underscore the fact that some degree of non-state ownership is beneficial for the
depoliticization  of  enterprise  decision-making.  The  results  are  consistent  with  the
arguments  of  Shleifer  and  Vishny (1994),  which  suggest  that  the  existence  of  private
owners and their individual interests in profit maximization reduces the bargaining power
of politicians and thereby increases the costs of political interference in enterprise decision-
making. 
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Skeptics  might  claim  that  the  greater  freedom of  corporatized  SOEs  could  simply
reflect a selection bias in the sense that the government only corporatized those SOEs that
were  not  needed  as  policy  tools.  In  fact,  the  selection  effect  is  consistent  with  the
observation that China’s central government delayed SOEs’ ownership reforms to preserve
SOEs as tools of employment provision. Based on our results, we are unable to determine
whether the government voluntarily refrains from using corporatized SOEs as policy tools
or whether it is simply unable to exert effective control owing to resistance from private
investors. In light of our recent empirical findings on the persistence of political control of
decision-making in China’s partially privatized listed enterprises (Opper et al. 2002, Wong
et al 2004), and given the fact  that the state retains a controlling share in corporatized
SOEs,  we have doubts that government will  completely restrain from involving in any
decision-making and that our results could be fully attributed to a selection bias. Instead,
we expect that they reflect the complementary effect of both mechanisms. 
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Table 1. Main Indicators of State-Owned Enterprises in China, 1990–2002
Main Indicators of State-Owned and State-Holding Industrial Enterprises 
Number of
Enterprises 
(unit = 1)
Gross
Industrial
Output Value
(unit = 100
million RMB)
Value Added
of Industry
(unit =100
million RMB)
Total Profits
(unit =100
million RMB)
No. of workers
(unit = 10.000)
Labor
productivity 
(yuan-person-
year)
1990 74775 12570 388 10346 12150
1991 75248 13934 4019 402 10664 13066
1992 74066 16711 5193 535 10889 15346
1993 80586 22088 7281 817 10920 20227
1994 79731 25301 7903 829 11214 22562
1995 87905 25890 8307 666 11261 22991
1996 86982 27289 8742 413 11244 24270
1997 74388 27859 9193 428 11044 25225
1998 64737 33621 11077 525 9058 37118
1999 61301 35571 12132 998 8572 41497
2000 53489 40554 13778 2408 8102 50055
2001 46767 42408 14652 2389 7640 55508
2002 41125 45179 15935 2633 7163 63073
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Various Issues)
1. The gross industrial output value in 1995 was calculated in accordance with new stipulations.
2. The overall labor productivity between 1994 and 1995 is incomparable because of a new definition
of gross industrial output value.
3. Data before 1994 include SOEs only.
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Table 2. Sample Distribution (323 State-Owned Enterprises)
Sectors/Cities Obs. Beijing Chenngdu Guangzhou Shanghai Tianjin
Accounting Services 15 2 5 2 3 3
Advertising & Marketing 20 1 4 2 10 3
Apparel & Leather Goods 50 11 12 6 12 9
Business Logistics Services 52 9 13 12 10 8
Communication Services 20 5 1 6 4 4
Consumer Products 18 1 8 1 5 3
Electronic Components 37 18 10 1 2 6
Electronic Equipment 39 10 8 3 8 10
Information Technology Services 22 3 2 6 4 7
Vehicles & Vehicle Parts 50 8 15 7 11 9
Total 323 68 78 46 69 62
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
  All SOEs Traditional SOEs Corporatized SOEs
Variable Name Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Labor Retrenchment     
Labor Retrenchment Rate Percent 896 4.37 20.84 562 4.71 19.67 364 3.80 22.69
Enterprise Production and Performance     
Employees Workers 944 1180.07 4999.6 583 1412.01 6190.52 361 805.49 1814.89
Capital 1000 RMB 962
247172.
8 1793799 588
324172.
5
2128997
0 374
126114.
4 847683
Age of Enterprise Year 966 25.5 20.47 590 28.39 20.72 376 20.97 19.23
Sales Revenue 1000 RMB 947
102217.
2 487393.7 583
125726.
2 594325.1 364
64563.9
9
224597.
1
Profit 1000 RMB 927
19974.7
8 177921.5 583
23083.8
2 215738.3 353
14981.4
5
88140.1
3
Return on Asset (ROA) Ratio 938 1.55 10.96 580 0.89 8.55 358 2.62 13.94
Competition     
Number of Competitor Enterprises 879 313.68 1247.43 542 381.08 1434.42 337 205.28 856.82
Export to Sales Ratio Ratio 947 6.63 19.64 583 7.38 21.36 364 5.43 16.48
Socioeconomic Environment (by city) Beijing Chengdu Guangzhou Shanghai Tianjin
Government Fiscal Position Ratio -3.19 2.76 -2.00 -2.66 -3.02
Reemployed Ratio for Laid-Off Workers Ratio 55.05 43.63 42.38 56.11 26.29
Employment Growth in Private Sectors Ratio 27.83 24.07 18.88 17.20 14.06
Unionization Rate Ratio 54.97 54.27 41.70 73.37 71.67
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Table 4. OLS Estimation on Labor Retrenchment, 1998–2000
Dependent Variable: 
Labor Retrenchment Rate
Traditional SOEs Corporatized SOEs
Business-Related Factors
Ln (Sales) -2.2136*** -3.4366***
(0.664) (1.074)
Ln (Profit) -1.3513*** -1.9883**
(0.460) (0.884)
Ln (Number of Competitors) 0.8935 0.2408 1.4187* 0.3739
(0.552) (0.409) (0.748) (0.877)
Export to Sales Ratio -0.0001 0.0231 0.0178 0.0268
(0.044) (0.058) (0.090) (0.084)
Political-Economic Factors
Fiscal Position to GDP ratio -0.6200** -0.9874*** -0.7991 -0.4871
(0.286) (0.305) (0.548) (0.634)
Reemployment Ratio for Laid-
Off Workers
0.1877* 0.0661 -0.1398 -0.1666
(0.098) (0.064) (0.095) (0.104)
Employment Growth in Private
Sector
0.0020 0.0817 -0.0569 0.0263
(0.074) (0.066) (0.123) (0.138)
Control Variables
One-Period Lagged Ln(Labor) 3.1958*** 2.6902*** 4.8627*** 3.2189***
(0.915) (0.762) (1.264) (1.144)
Ln (Age) 1.2858 1.3508 5.2032** 8.0920***
(1.201) (1.456) (2.082) (2.735)
Unionization -0.1021 0.0035 0.0853 0.1002
(0.092) (0.093) (0.121) (0.145)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Constant -2.4460 -11.2906 -4.2212 -18.2319
(9.538) (11.256) (12.543) (14.318)
Observations 479 358 284 232
Adjusted R-Squared 0.163 0.155 0.232 0.236
Note: 1) ***, **, and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
 2) The numbers in brackets are white-correct standard error in the presence of heteroskdasticity.
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Table 5. Robustness Check Using Lagged Performance as the Instrument 
Dependent Variable: 
Labor Retrenchment Rate
Traditional SOEs Corporatized SOEs
Business-Related Factors
Ln (Sales) -2.499*** -2.895**
(0.657) (1.176)
Ln (Profit) -0.9782* -1.0596
(0.554) (1.234)
Ln (Number of Competitors) 0.8455** 0.4810 1.3418** 0.8466
(0.4177) (0.424) (0.667) (0.782)
Export to Sales Ratio -0.0002 -0.0511 0.0121 0.0762
(0.042) (0.055) (0.076) (0.071)
Political-Economic Factors
Fiscal Position to GDP Ratio -0.635* -0.988*** -0.7872 -0.4936
(0.324) (0.321) (0.562) (0.595)
Reemployment Ratio for Laid-Off
Workers
0.1835** -0.0097 -0.1154 -0.1436
(0.074) (0.071) (0.106) (0.112)
Employment Growth in Private
Sectors
-0.0065 0.1268* -0.0068 0.1947
(0.066) (0.069) (0.124) (0.137)
Control Variables
One-period Lagged Ln (Labor) 3.3519*** 2.4952*** 4.5059*** 2.4650
(0.889) (0.828) (1.353) (1.609)
Ln (Age) 1.3885 0.4707 4.9595*** 4.4580**
(1.108) (1.190) (1.436) (1.776)
Unionization -0.1010 -0.0450 0.1208 -0.0357
(0.075) (0.083) (0.147) (0.168)
Sectoral Dummies Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Constant -0.6380 -4.2568 -13.1079 -11.6876
(8.840) (8.894) (13.564) (15.357)
Observations 476 295 278 190
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.27
First Stage Regression
 Lagged Ln (Enterprise Performance)
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.90 0.76 0.86 0.72
Note: 1) ***, **, and * represent significant level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
 2) The numbers in brackets are white-correct standard error in the presence of heteroskdasticity.
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